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There is a growing literature which analyses, using cross-country data, whether 
institutions or geography is the most important deep determinant of economic 
development. The empirical proxies for institutions used in this literature focus on the 
definition of institutions, formal and informal. This study argues that the concept of 
informal institutions is similar to social capital. However, the social capital and 
‘institutions as a deep determinant’ literatures rarely acknowledge the existence of the 
other. It is argued that social capital meets the criteria for being a deep determinant of 
development and that both the cross-country literature on social capital, and the deep 
determinants of development literature, could be enriched by empirically modelling 
social capital as a deep determinant of development. 
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1 Introduction 
There is a growing literature which analyses, using cross-country data, whether 
institutions or geography is the most important deep determinant of economic 
development. Key contributions to this literature include Hall and Jones (1999), 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Rodrik et al. (2002), Sachs (2003), Easterly and Levine 
(2003) and Olsson and Hibbs (2005). This literature typically cites North’s (1990) 
definition of institutions as being ‘the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, 
[they] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’. However, the 
empirical proxies for institutions that are used in this literature focus on what North 
(1990: 3) defined as formal institutions; informal institutions, which North argued were 
more important than formal institutions, are not considered. This study argues that 
proxies for informal institutions, which North argues are more important than formal 
institutions, should be incorporated in this deep determinants literature. 
 
This study also argues that the notion of social capital is similar to North’s notion of 
informal institutions. Social capital can be a difficult term to pin down, but most 
definitions include (at least one of) the degree of trust, co-operative norms and 
associational memberships or networks within a society. Economists have become 
increasingly interested in social capital, following the seminal work of Coleman (1988) 
(a sociologist) and Putnam et al. (1993) (a political scientist). Since the publication of 
these studies a vast quantity of research on social capital has been published by 
economists, as well as by researchers from other academic disciplines. Isham et al. 
(2002) report that citations for social capital in the EconLit database have been doubling 
every year since the late 1990s. Further evidence of increasing interest in social capital 
by economists is that a new sub-category on social norms and social capital (Z13) was 
recently added to the Journal of Economic Literature codes. However, as noted by 
Fafchamps and Minten (2002), the concept of social capital is still regarded with 
suspicion by many economists.  
 
Hence, this study puts forward two main arguments. The first is that in terms of its 
definition, and the arguments advanced as to why social capital is likely to affect 
economic performance, social capital is a very similar concept to what North (1990) 
defined as informal institutions. Social capital can therefore be viewed as part of the 
institutions continuum. The second argument is that ideally proxies for social 
capital/informal institutions should be included in deep determinants regressions. This 
would enrich the deep determinants literature by including information on both ends of 
the institutions continuum. It will also make it possible to model interactions between 
formal institutions and social capital, and may offer some guidance on how to deal with 
the problem of endogeneity in the social capital literature. Thinking of social capital as a 
deep determinant of development also has implications for what control variables 
should be included in empirical work.    2
Section 2 will briefly review the literature on defining social capital, with a view to 
highlighting the similarities between the concepts of social capital and informal 
institutions. Section 3 will summarise some of the key arguments in the literature as to 
why social capital is likely to affect economic performance. It will be argued that these 
arguments are consistent with viewing social capital as a deep determinant of 
development. Section 4 will discuss how social capital is measured in the existing cross-
country literature, and comment on how these, or other, measures of social capital could 
be usefully incorporated in the institutions as a deep determinant literature. Section 5 
will summarise the potential advantages of modelling social capital in a deep 
determinants framework and Section 6 will conclude. 
2  Social capital: is it the same thing as informal institutions? 
Defining social capital is not an easy task, as social capital means different things to 
different people and many different definitions have been proposed in the literature. For 
that reason, this study will review some of the most widely cited definitions of social 
capital that have been proposed in the literature, without trying to make a judgement as 
to which definition is superior. This will make it possible to compare social capital to 
informal institutions, while recognising that not everyone agrees on how social capital 
should be defined. 
 
Most definitions of social capital include at least one, and in several cases two or more, 
of the following: trust, networks and group memberships, and a shared set of co-
operative norms. The term social capital has been around for some time, with Woolcock 
(1998) arguing that it was first used in its modern sense by Hanifan (1920). Readers 
interested in the development of the term from that time are referred to Woolcock. For 
the purposes of this study, we will confine our attention to how the term social capital 
has been defined since the work of Coleman (1988), focusing on some of the most 
commonly cited definitions. An excellent review of how social capital is defined in the 
recent literature can be found in Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004). Appendix Table A1 
reproduces the key definitions of social capital as summarised by Durlauf and 
Fafchamps, with some additions. Note that Knack (2002) splits social capital into two 
components: government and civil, a point that is discussed more fully below. 
 
A concept that appears in several of these definitions is that of co-operative norms. 
These norms may include forming orderly queues at airport check-ins, farmers helping 
their neighbours to harvest crops, showing respect for other drivers on the road, not 
parking in car parks reserved for the disabled unless you are disabled, and so on. 
Networks and associational memberships also appear in several of these definitions. 
Associational memberships may include membership in sports teams, choral societies, 
church or religious groups etc. Networks can be thought of as the people you know or 
interact with, which includes informal interactions, in addition to associational 
memberships. Associations can be split into horizontal and vertical associations.   3
Horizontal associations are those in which members relate to each other on an equal 
basis (a sports club, for example), whereas vertical associations are those ‘characterized 
by hierarchical relationships and unequal power among members’ (Grootaert 1999: 5). 
The Catholic Church is sometimes used as an example of a hierarchical association 
(La  Porta et al. 1997). Associations can also be split into those which promote the 
interests of their members only (a revolving credit scheme) and those which aim to 
promote the interests of members and non-members alike (such as those formed for the 
purpose of charity work). 
 
With regard to trust, it is important to note that there are different spheres of trust. At 
one end of the continuum is trust in people you interact with on a regular basis (such as 
friends and family), and at the other end is trust in those you do not know. Some 
researchers (Whitely 2000, for example) refer to trust in those you do not know as 
generalized trust. Uslaner (2002: 5) defines generalized trust slightly differently as the 
idea that ‘most people can be trusted’ and defines particularised trust as trust in one’s 
own kind. Putnam (2000) and Holm and Danielson (2005) refer to trust in those you 
interact with regularly as thick trust, and trust in those you do not know as thin trust. 
Related to the notion of different spheres of trust is the distinction between bonding, 
bridging and linking social capital. Building on Granovetter’s (1973) notion of weak 
and strong ties, Woolcock (2001) defines bonding social capital as links with family, 
friends and neighbours, bridging social capital as ties that are slightly more distant, such 
as with workmates and acquaintances, and linking social capital as the ability to benefit 
from ties with those outside one’s immediate group of contacts. 
 
It seems likely that trust and co-operation will be built up by repeated interactions with 
others; hence networks and associational memberships can be seen as a source of trust 
and co-operation. In fact, some researchers (Woolcock 2001, for example) prefer to 
define social capital as norms and networks, and see trust as being a consequence of 
social capital, rather than part of social capital per se. Uslaner (2002), on the other hand, 
argues that trust is the cause, not the consequence, of interactions with others. 
 
Fafchamps and Minten (2002) and Bezemer et al. (2004) also prefer to think of social 
capital as networks. Fafchamps and Minten (2002: 173-4) argue that definitions of 
social capital fall into two camps. The first, which they argue includes those of Coleman 
(1988) and Putnam et al. (1993), sees ‘social capital as a “stock” of trust and an 
emotional attachment to a group or society at large that facilitate the provision of public 
goods’. The second type of definition sees social capital as ‘an individual asset that 
benefits a single individual or firm’, which is sometimes referred to as ‘social network 
capital’ to avoid confusion. Bezemer et al. (2004: 3) use the term ‘relational capital’ to 
denote this individual level of social capital, defining it as ‘productive contacts that 
individuals use in achieving sold output’. They further suggest using the terms ‘social 
network’ or ‘communal social capital’ to denote the membership of clubs. The most 
commonly cited definition from Table A1 is probably Putnam et al. (1993), which   4
emphasises trust, norms and networks. These notions appear in most definitions, with 
norms and networks featuring the most prominently. 
 
A key argument of this study is that there is a significant degree of overlap between the 
concepts of social capital and (informal) institutions. North’s (1990) definition of 
institutions is the most frequently cited, in both the social capital and institutions 
literatures. North (1990: 3) defines institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society or, 
more formally, [they] are the humanly devised constraints that shape human 
interaction’. If North’s definition were to end here, then it would perhaps be possible to 
argue that the concept of institutions is quite different to that of social capital. Perhaps 
the rules of the game are those imposed by the state, with social capital referring to the 
informal norms or conventions that have evolved over time without these being codified 
in statute. However, North goes further and distinguishes between formal and informal 
institutions. 
 
Formal institutions are defined by North (1990) as rules that human beings devised (a 
good example being laws and regulations enacted by governments) whereas informal 
regulations include conventions and codes of behaviour. North uses the analogy of rules 
in sports to make the distinction clear. The written rules of a sport are analogous to 
formal institutions, whereas unwritten codes of conduct, such as an acceptance that it is 
unacceptable to kick an opponent in the head, are analogous to informal institutions.1 
North (p.36) argues that people in the Western world tend to think of life being ordered 
by formal rules, when in fact their actions are guided more by informal constraints, such 
as ‘codes of conduct, norms of behavior and conventions’. He goes on to argue that 
‘underlying these informal constraints/institutions are formal rules, but these are seldom 
the obvious and immediate source of choice in daily interactions’. The implication is 
that informal institutions are actually more important than formal institutions. It is also 
important to note that North acknowledges institutions are not always easy to classify 
into formal and informal, but suggests the two should be seen as opposite ends of a 
continuum, with taboos, customs and traditions at one end, and written constitutions at 
the other. North’s notion of institutions, once broadened to include informal institutions, 
includes the concepts of norms of behaviour and social conventions, hence it seems to 
overlap significantly with the notion of social capital. This is especially true if it is 
acknowledged that North discusses the importance of co-operation. Although North 
says little about trust, co-operation does presuppose some degree of trust. A key theme 
of North (1990) is that good institutions will encourage co-operation and reduce 
transactions costs, notions that also feature prominently in the social capital literature. 
 
                                                 
1 It is true, of course, that in the vast majority of sports it is against the rules to kick an opponent in the 
head. However, in some sports, there is an unwritten code of conduct that although it may be acceptable 
to punch an opponent, which is also against the rules, that kicking an opponent in the head goes beyond 
the pale.   5
The above arguments suggest that the concept of social capital falls within North’s 
definition of institutions. Interestingly, North’s followers tend to focus their attention on 
formal institutions, with informal institutions having disappeared off the radar. In the 
last few years a literature has flourished examining whether institutions or geography is 
the most important deep determinant of income per capita. Important contributions in 
this area include Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002), Rodrik et al. (2002), Sachs (2003), 
Easterly and Levine (2003), Olsson and Hibbs (2005), Fielding and Torres (2005) and 
Owen and Weatherstone (2005). 
 
In terms of definition, deep (or fundamental) determinants of income are distinct from 
proximate determinants. The proximate determinants can be thought of as variables that 
would appear in the aggregate production function, such as labour, physical capital, 
human capital and technology, plus policy related variables such as the rate of inflation 
or the level of government consumption. The deep determinants can be thought of as the 
variables that affect the proximate determinants, and are hence the underlying 
determinants of income per capita. Deep determinants are not necessarily exogenous, 
but are thought to change only slowly, if at all, over time (Glaeser et al. 2004). In deep 
determinants regressions the proximate determinants, such as the accumulation of 
physical and human capital and policy type variables are not included as control 
variables, as this would mean the indirect effect of a deep determinant on income per 
capita, via the proximate determinants, would not be picked up. 
 
Within this deep determinants literature, the focus is exclusively on formal, rather than 
informal, institutions. This literature typically cites North’s notion of institutions 
defining the rules of the game, but the distinction between formal and informal 
institutions is not discussed. When it comes to measuring institutions, the protection of 
property rights and the rule of law tend to feature prominently; norms, conventions and 
codes of conduct do not. This is despite the fact that North (1990: 53) argued 
a mixture of informal norms, rules, and enforcement characteristics 
together defines the choice set and results in outcomes. Looking only at 
the formal rules themselves, therefore, gives us an inadequate and 
frequently misleading notion about the relationship between formal 
constraints and performance.2 
 
One exception is a recent paper by Tabellini (2005), which although not strictly part of 
this strand of literature,3 argues that institutions can be interpreted broadly to include 
                                                 
2 It could be argued that measures of the extent to which property rights are protected and the rule of law 
prevails will be a function of both formal rules and informal institutions, hence these measures are 
picking up informal institutions to some extent. However, if informal institutions are omitted from the 
analysis, this precludes any other effect of informal institutions on income, over and above the effect via 
property rights and the rule of law. 
3 Tabellini does not include any geographic variables, hence does not contribute to the debate as to 
whether institutions or geography is the most important deep determinant of development.   6
systems of belief and social norms, which Tabellini describes as cultural variables. 
Rather than including formal and informal institutions as explanatory variables in the 
same equation, historical data on formal institutions are used as instruments for culture. 
This paper is discussed in more detail in Section 4.6. 
 
It is also interesting to consider the extent to which the two literatures (social capital and 
the institutions as a deep determinant) acknowledge the existence of the other. An 
interesting experiment is to compare the reference lists of two recent survey papers, 
both of which are to appear in the Handbook of Economic Growth, Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004) on social capital and Acemoglu et al. (2004) on institutions. Of the 
more than 150 references cited in Acemoglu et al. (2004), only three of them (Durlauf 
and Fafchamps 2003, an ealier version of Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004; Knack and 
Keefer 1997; Putnam et al. 1993) are from the social capital literature. Durlauf and 
Fafchamps also cite just over 150 references, but none of them are from the deep 
determinants literature. They do, however, cite North (1990). 
 
The preceding discussion begs the question of whether ‘informal institutions’ more 
accurately describes the concept being defined than ‘social capital’.4 Use of the term 
social capital has led to debates about whether social capital is social, and more 
commonly, whether it is capital, and, if it is, what this implies for how it enters the 
production function (see, for example, Woolcock 1998; Collier 2002; Paldam and 
Svendsen 2000; Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Arrow 2000; Sobel 2002).5 Such debates 
could be avoided if the term ‘social capital’ were replaced with ‘informal institutions’. 
An alternative would be to simply focus on the notions of trust, norms and networks as 
separate entities, rather than relying on an all encompassing term such as social capital. 
However, this is unlikely to happen. ‘Social capital’ rolls a little more easily off the 
tongue, than does ‘informal institutions’, and has a softer, more interdisciplinary ring to 
it. Which may not be a bad thing. If use of the term social capital encourages 
communication across academic disciplines, then more social capital has been created in 
the form of networks. In the words of Woolcock (1998: 188) ‘[i]n social capital, 
historians, political scientists, anthropologists, economists, sociologists, and 
policymakers—and the various camps within each field—may once again begin to find 
a common language within which to engage one another in open, constructive debate, a 
language that disciplinary provincialisms have largely suppressed over the last one-
hundred-and-fifty years.’ 
 
Before ending this section on defining social capital, it should be noted that Knack 
(2002) splits social capital into government and civil social capital. In a definition not 
                                                 
4 Dasgupta (2000), in reviewing the social capital literature, uses the phrase informal institutions, and 
asks in passing whether social capital is merely another name for good institutions. However, this point is 
not developed. 
5 The standard argument against social capital being a form of capital is that the accumulation of social 
capital does not necessarily require sacrifice (see for example Arrow 2000).   7
included in Table A1, Grafton and Knowles (2004) distinguish between civic social 
capital and public institutional social capital, with the latter being proxied by measures 
of corruption and democracy. Grootaert (1999: 5), also not included in Table A1, talks 
about a macro level of social capital which ‘includes institutions such as government, 
the rule of law, civil and political liberties, etc.’ These notions of government, public 
institutional and macro social capital sound identical to formal institutions. Collier 
(2002: 19) notes that ‘many people restrict the term “social capital” to civil social 
capital’. Given the similarity between institutions and government, public institutional 
and macro, social capital, it would seem wise to restrict definitions of social capital to 
civil social capital. 
3  Social capital and economic performance 
This section of the study reviews the key arguments in the literature as to how social 
capital may affect economic performance, with a view to determining whether social 
capital can be considered a deep determinant of income, in the sense that it influences 
either the level of total factor productivity or the accumulation of labour or physical or 
human capital. Many arguments have been put forward in the literature as to why social 
capital may improve economic performance. Most of these arguments can be classified 
under the following headings: increasing the number of mutually beneficial trades, 
solving collective action problems, reducing monitoring and transactions costs (which 
could alternatively be referred to as solving principal-agent conflicts) and improving 
information flows. It is beyond the scope of this study to review every argument in the 
literature as to why social capital may affect economic performance; instead a small 
number of examples will be reviewed under each of the headings listed above. 
3.1  Increasing the number of mutually beneficial trades 
It has been recognised for centuries that a high degree of trust and co-operation will 
increase the number of mutually beneficial trades. For example, the eighteenth century 
Scottish philosopher David Hume (cited in Putnam et al. 1993: 163) discussed the 
importance of co-operation, and implicitly trust, using the example of two corn farmers. 
If two corn farmers’ crops ripen at different times, but they do not have enough time to 
harvest their own crops, it makes sense for each farmer to assist with the other’s harvest. 
However, this may not occur if the two farmers do not trust each other. The farmer 
whose crop ripens last may suspect that if she helps with her neighbour’s harvest, this 
may not be reciprocated. 
 
It is, of course, possible to argue that a monetary transaction could take place to 
overcome the lack of co-operation outlined in Hume’s example of the corn farmers. If 
Farmer B, whose crop ripens last, suspects Farmer A will not reciprocate she could offer 
to work for Farmer A for a day’s wages, and then hire Farmer A to help harvest her own 
corn in the future. However, this transaction, like all transactions, will require a degree 
of trust. Farmer B may fear that having worked for Farmer A for a day, she may not be   8
paid. Anticipating this, she may demand the wages in advance, but then Farmer A will 
worry that Farmer B will take the money, and not provide a day’s labour. At some 
point, an element of trust is required. As noted by Arrow (1972) virtually all 
transactions require an element of trust, meaning that an absence of trust reduces the 
number of mutually beneficial trades that can take place. Arrow suggests that a lack of 
trust explains much of the economic backwardness observed in the world. 
 
Another example of trust leading to a greater number of trades is the development of 
revolving credit schemes to overcome incomplete, or non-existent capital markets. The 
success of such schemes requires that members do not free ride. In a world governed by 
self-interest, some members may be tempted to borrow money from the scheme, and 
then refuse to continue to make contributions. It is also important that people have good 
information about those whom they are thinking of joining with in a scheme. A high 
degree of trust (worthiness) is required to ensure that members do not free ride, and 
individuals who are well networked will have good information about other potential 
members of the scheme (Narayan and Pritchett 1999; Grootaert, 1998). In the words of 
Coleman (1988: S103) ‘one could not imagine a rotating-credit association operating in 
urban areas marked by a high degree of social disorganization—or, in other words, by a 
lack of social capital.’ Social networks will also facilitate lending in the absence of 
revolving credit schemes. Grootaert (1998: 5) argues that members of a soccer team will 
be more likely to lend money to each other than to people they do not know. Hence the 
existence of networks, and the trust associated with them, are likely to increase the 
supply of informal credit. Informal credit is going to be especially important in LDCs 
where formal credit markets are typically not as well developed as in the industrialized 
countries.  
3.2  The resolution of collective action problems 
Societies with high degrees of social capital may find it easier to solve collective action 
problems than societies less well endowed with social capital. For example, a set of 
norms may evolve over time governing the use of common property resources. A set of 
norms to prevent a fishery being over-fished may include not fishing during the 
spawning season, releasing under-sized fish and not catching more fish than a family 
can eat. With regard to the provision of public goods, these are more likely to be 
provided, without recourse to government funding, in societies where co-operative 
behaviour is the norm. The same can be said for internalising externalities. 
 
Community-based institutions may also be formed to manage common property 
resources; several examples are given in Ostrom (1990). For example, for many 
centuries Spanish farmers have formed organizations to manage irrigation canals 
(huertas). The farmers elect officials, whose job it is to determine who may draw water 
at what time, to police the system and to settle disputes between members. Similar 
community-based institutions have evolved to manage irrigation schemes in many other 
countries including Nepal and India. It could be argued that these community-based   9
institutions sound like a form of de facto government, but, if they are, they represent a 
decentralized, bottom-up form of government. The fact that it may be difficult to 
determine whether these community-based institutions should be classified as formal of 
informal institutions highlights the point that social capital (informal institutions) and 
formal institutions are at opposite ends of the same continuum, with, for example, 
community-based institutions falling somewhere in between. 
 
The standard textbook solution to collective action problems requires some action on 
the part of the government: defining and enforcing property rights in the case of 
common property resources, public funding in the case of public goods, and taxes or 
subsidies in the case of externalities. However, this requires strong formal institutions. 
In cases where formal institutions are weak, which may well be the case in many 
developing countries, social capital may act as a substitute for formal institutions.  
3.3  Reducing monitoring and transactions costs 
In a low-trust environment, entrepreneurs will assume that workers will shirk unless 
closely supervised, so to reduce this risk supervisors will be hired, reducing 
productivity. Woolcock (1998) argues that in many developing countries hospitals and 
schools may exist, but the doctors and teachers are often not at work. The issue of 
monitoring workers may also act as a constraint on firm size in low-trust economies. 
Once a firm reaches a certain size, the owner operator has to delegate a degree of 
managerial decision making to others, especially in semi-independent parts of the 
company. Paldam and Svendsen (2000) argue that a lack of social capital prevents small 
firms growing into large firms in many parts of Africa for this very reason.  
 
Anticipating problems with workers shirking, employers may respond by only 
employing people already known to them, rather than employing the person best 
qualified to do the job. In a society that is divided along ethnic or religious lines, 
preference may be given to hiring those from the same ethnic and/or religious group as 
the employer, in the belief that they can be trusted more. In this scenario, the most 
skilled workers may not be employed, which has obvious consequences for the 
productivity of the firm. 
 
With regards to transactions costs, Fafchamps and Minten (2002: 175) argue that when 
trust is present agents can ‘lower their guard and economize on transactions costs such 
as the need to inspect quality before buying, or the need to organize payment in cash at 
the time of delivery’. They go on to argue that trust ‘enables agents to place and take 
orders, pay by check, use invoicing, provide trade credit, and offer warranty’, noting 
that these features of markets are taken for granted in developed countries, but are often 
lacking in developing countries.    10
3.4  Improving the flow of information 
The more people interact with each other, be this in choral societies, sports groups, 
religious or educational organizations, the better the information they will have about 
each other, making it easier, for example, to set up revolving credit schemes and the 
like. It may also improve the flow of information about best practice techniques, making 
the introduction of new technologies more likely, hence increasing the level of 
productivity. Networks and membership of groups may also help overcome the 
impediments to information flows due to social divergence: the phenomena whereby 
individuals are more likely to communicate with those with similar incomes, education, 
ethnicity, etc, as themselves, rather than with people from a diverse range of 
backgrounds (see Grafton et al. 2004a, b). 
3.5  The negative effects of social capital 
So far only the positive effects of social capital have been considered. It has to be 
acknowledged that there are also cases where social capital can have negative effects. It 
was argued above that social capital may have a positive effect on the adoption of new 
techniques. However, it is also possible that some customs or norms may hinder the 
introduction of new techniques. For example, Rogers (1983) discusses the example of a 
Peruvian village whose inhabitants largely refuse to boil their drinking water because, 
according to local custom, only the sick are permitted to drink boiled water. This 
example draws attention to the fact that social capital is not always a force for good. It is 
quite possible that farmers and business people may be reluctant to introduce new 
techniques that would improve productivity, because this would go against the 
established way of doing things.  
 
It is also possible that some networks or associations may hamper the adoption of new 
techniques. As noted by Paldam (2000), guilds, trade organizations and unions often try 
to hinder change. Networks can also lead to collusion on the part of firms, at the 
expense of consumers (Fafchamps and Minten 2002). Social networks, such as guilds, 
cartels, the mafia, political organizations and lobbying groups may provide benefits for 
members, but this can often come at the expense of non members (Ogilivie 2004). 
 
Nooteboom (2005: 2) argues that in developing countries high degrees of personalized 
trust may actually ‘lock people into closed, localized, cohesive communities that keep 
them from opening up to wider perspectives of development, from efficiency and 
innovation, in wider, more dispersed groups’. For this to occur would require that the 
radius of trust be limited. If people were just as likely to trust strangers as to trust those 
they interact with regularly, the problem would not occur. However, if the radius of 
trust is limited, this may impede economic development. 
 
Bezemer et al. (2004: 13) argue that market-based economic development requires that 
‘inefficient search institutions such as informal networks and trust need to be replaced   11
with more efficient (typically formally defined) market institutions’. Hence they argue 
that although informal networks and trust may reduce monitoring and search costs, 
compared to the alternative of their being no search devices at all, that they can only do 
this up to a certain point. Ultimately, sustained economic growth is going to require 
these informal mechanisms be replaced by more formal market-based institutions, 
which may not happen if this is not in the interests of the political elite. Hence high 
levels of social capital may hinder the adoption of the formal institutions required to 
promote economic development. 
3.6  The interaction between social capital and formal institutions 
Some of the arguments outlined above suggest that social capital can act as a substitute 
for formal institutions. For example, in the absence of strong formal institutions, social 
capital may make it easier to resolve collective action problems. The arguments 
regarding the provision of credit suggest that social capital can act as a substitute when 
formal credit markets are not well developed. In such cases, social capital may be 
expected to have a more marked effect on economic performance in countries where 
formal institutions are weak. Empirically, if an interaction term between social capital 
and formal institutions is included in a cross-country regressions explaining income per 
capita we would expect the interaction term to be negative, controlling for the level of 
social capital and formal institutions. 
 
An alternative argument is that formal institutions, such as laws protecting property 
rights, are likely to be more effective when the level of trust is high. In addition, formal 
arrangements regarding the provision of public goods are also likely to be undermined 
in societies where cheating on your taxes is an acceptable norm. As argued by Durlauf 
and Fafchamps (2004: 14), ‘[p]ublic good delivery is best accomplished when the 
power of the state to tax and mobilize resources is combined with trust and community 
involvement’. If this argument is accepted, then formal institutions are likely to be more 
effective in countries with high levels of social capital. In this case, the interaction term 
would be expected to be positive, having controlled for the levels of social capital and 
institutions. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have argued that social capital (informal institutions) and 
formal institutions can either be substitutes or complements. This has important 
implications for empirical work, as it suggests that it is important not only to control for 
both social capital and formal institutions, but to include an interaction term to capture 
interactions between the two. The only cross-country empirical study that includes 
proxies for both social capital and formal institutions is Knack and Keefer (1997), 
discussed in Section 4 below, but no interaction term is included. Future empirical work 
could be enriched by including such an interaction term.   12
3.7  Social capital: factor of production or deep determinant? 
It is sometimes argued in the literature that social capital can be thought of as a new 
factor of production (for example, Paldam and Svendsen 2000), which would mean 
social capital is a proximate determinant of development. However, the arguments 
discussed above tend to suggest that social capital will affect the accumulation of other 
factors of production, or affect the level of total factor productivity, rather than social 
capital being a new factor of production in its own right. For example, if social capital 
leads to the establishment of informal credit markets, this will facilitate the 
accumulation of physical and human capital. If high levels of trust and co-operation lead 
to farmers helping to harvest their neighbours’ crops, more labour is being used. When 
social capital helps resolve collective action problems, efficiency is increased. If social 
capital reduces transactions and monitoring costs, or leads to the introduction of new 
technologies, this will increase the level of total factor productivity. Hence, thinking of 
social capital as a new factor of production may not be the best way to capture the effect 
of social capital on output. A more useful way forward, especially in the cross-country 
literature, may be to think of social capital as a deep, determinant of income, in the 
same way it has become standard in recent times to model the effects of geography and 
institutions on income per capita.  
4  Measuring social capital in cross-country studies 
The previous section of the study argued that, in terms of the arguments as to why social 
capital will affect income, social capital should be modelled as a deep determinant of 
development. However, to be considered a deep determinant of development, a variable 
must also meet the criterion of changing only slowly over time. This section of the study 
will critique the social capital proxies used in past cross-country empirical work and 
discuss how much they vary over time. Before proceeding, it should be acknowledged 
that the majority of empirical studies on social capital use micro data, collected at the 
individual or household level, rather than cross-country data. This micro literature will 
not be reviewed here, given that the focus of this study is on modelling social capital as 
a deep determinant of economic development, in the same way formal institutions have 
been modelled, using cross-country data. Readers interested in a review of the micro 
literature are referred to Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) and Knowles (2005, an earlier 
version of this study). 
 
Section 4.1 will discuss how social capital is typically measured in the existing cross-
country literature analysing the effect of social capital on economic variables, such as 
economic growth and the rate of investment. The discussion will be confined to 
measures of civil social capital, on the grounds that measures of government social 
capital are really measures of formal institutions.  Section 4.2 will discuss the extent to 
which these social capital proxies are likely to be valid and Section 4.3 will discuss the 
extent to which these proxies vary over time. Section 4.4 will discuss how highly   13
correlated are measures of formal and informal institutions. Section 4.5 will make some 
suggestions regarding additional proxies for which data could be collected in the future. 
Section 4.6 will ask whether any lessons can be learnt from the deep determinants 
literature with regard to dealing with the problem of endogeneity with regard to social 
capital.  
4.1  Social capital proxies used in the existing cross-country literature 
Many definitions of social capital include, at least one of, the degree of trust, co-
operative norms and networks within a society. A widely cited empirical paper that 
proxies for all three of these variables is Knack and Keefer (1997), who use three 
different proxies for social capital: TRUST, CIVIC and GROUPS. These three 
measures of social capital are derived from the World Values Survey (Ingelhart 1994). 
There have been four different waves of the World Values Survey carried out at 
different points in time, although only two waves had been conducted at the time Knack 
and Keefer carried out their work. 
 
TRUST measures the percentage of individuals in a country who answered ‘most people 
can be trusted’ to the question ‘generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people’. CIVIC is an index 
which ranges from 5 to 50, where respondents were asked to assign a score between 1 
and 10 as to whether they agreed that certain behaviours were justified, with a 1 
indicating the behaviour was never justified and a 10 indicating that the behaviour was 
always justified. The five behaviours are (1) claiming a government benefit to which 
you are not entitled, (2) avoiding a fare on public transport, (3) cheating on taxes if you 
have the chance, (4) buying something that you knew was stolen and (5) accepting a 
bribe in the course of one’s duties. Knack and Keefer transform the data so that a score 
of 50 indicates the highest possible level of CIVIC and a score of 5 indicates the lowest 
possible level of CIVIC. GROUPS is the average number of groups people belong to in 
each country.  
 
From the perspective of development economics, it needs to be noted that the sample of 
countries for which Knack and Keefer present data on TRUST, CIVIC and GROUPS is 
dominated by developed countries. Of the 29 countries included in their sample, only 10 
(South Korea, India, South Africa, Argentina, Nigeria, Chile, Portugal, Mexico, Turkey 
and Brazil) are developing countries. The developing countries do not fare particularly 
well in terms of the social capital measures, especially in the case of TRUST, with only 
South Korea getting an above average score. In Brazil, only 6.7 percent of the sample 
think others could generally be trusted; in Turkey the figure is only 10 percent, 
compared to a sample average of 36 percent. Two more waves of the World Values 
Survey have been compiled since Knack and Keefer was published. The latest wave 
(Ingelhart et al. 2004) includes data for 33 developing countries, as well as several 
former communist states from Eastern Europe. For the 33 developing countries, the 
average value of TRUST is 23.5, whereas for the developed countries in the sample it is   14
42. Whether these data can be taken as reliable evidence that social capital is low in 
developing countries will be discussed in Section 4.2. 
 
Turning to the results of empirical work using the World Values survey data, Knack and 
Keefer find that TRUST and CIVIC are both positively correlated with growth in output 
per worker, and with the average rate of investment, across countries, when these 
variables are included in Barro-style regressions. The GROUPS variable is found to not 
have a statistically significant effect in explaining both investment and growth. Zak and 
Knack (2001) update the empirical work of Knack and Keefer, with a larger sample of 
countries, but include only TRUST as a social capital proxy, not CIVIC nor GROUPS. 
The empirical results obtained are broadly consistent with Knack and Keefer. La Porta 
et al. (1997) examine the effect of TRUST on a range of proxies for economic 
development, using cross-country data. Controlling for the level of income per capita, 
TRUST is found to be significantly positively correlated with the quality and adequacy 
of infrastructure, high school completions, the adequacy of the education system and the 
rate of economic growth. TRUST is found to be significantly negatively correlated with 
the infant mortality rate and the inflation rate. Tabellini (2005) finds TRUST to be 
positively correlated with income per capita, both across countries, and across European 
regions. Heliwell (1996) finds measures of trust and associational memberships from 
the World Values Survey to be negatively correlated with growth for a sample of 17 
OECD countries. 
 
Knack and Keefer’s TRUST measure is based on a question about generalized trust. The 
early waves of the World Values Survey also ask questions about peoples’ trust in 
family and fellow nationals, as well as the more general question that Knack and Keefer 
focus on. Whitely (2000) combines the responses to all three questions into a social 
capital index using principal components analysis, and finds a significant positive 
correlation between this index and income per capita across countries, with social 
capital having a bigger influence on income per capita than does human capital. 
 
In an often overlooked section of their paper, Knack and Keefer examine the effect of 
TRUST on output per worker, physical capital per worker, human capital per worker and 
the level of total factor productivity. TRUST is significantly positively correlated with 
the first three of these variables, as long as no other control variables are included. 
However, when measures of property rights, openness and distance from the equator are 
included as control variables, the only equation in which TRUST is significant is that 
explaining human capital per worker. Given the range of control variables included, 
these results could be considered a deep determinants-of-development equation. Note, 
however, that no attempt is made to control for endogeneity, other than arguing that, as 
TRUST is measured for an earlier time period than the dependent variables, it is 
predetermined. Neither do Knack and Keefer include an interaction term for social 
capital and formal institutions. Recall also that Knack and Keefer’s sample is dominated 
by developed countries.   15
4.2  How valid are the social capital proxies? 
It is important to acknowledge some potential problems with these measures of social 
capital. Whether peoples’ answers to the TRUST question are correlated with how 
trusting they are of others, and/or how trustworthy they are, in economic experiments 
has been studied by Glaeser et al. (2000) for the USA and Holm and Danielson (2005) 
for Tanzania and Sweden. Both studies were carried out on under-graduate economics 
students, so the results may not be representative of the whole population. Glaser et al. 
find there is no correlation between peoples’ answers to the TRUST question and how 
trusting they are of others, but that there is a positive correlation between TRUST and 
how trustworthy an individual is. Holm and Danielson find that there is no correlation 
between how trusting people claim to be (or how trustworthy they are) and their 
behaviour in experiments in Tanzania, but there is in Sweden.  
 
The Holm and Danielson experiments also provide information on whether people are 
more trusting in Sweden than in Tanzania. This is an interesting comparison to make, as 
Sweden has one of the highest TRUST scores (66 per cent) in the fourth wave of the 
World Values Survey, whereas Tanzania has one of the lowest (8 per cent). In the 
experiment the subjects were divided into two different groups, A and B. Each 
individual was paired with a member of the opposite group, but they did not know the 
identity of the person with whom they were paired. Each person in Group A was 
allocated a sum of money. They then had to decide how much money they would 
transfer to the person they were paired with in Group B, and this amount of money was 
tripled. The person in Group B, then had to decide how much of the money to transfer, 
if any, to the person in Group A. Holm and Danielson interpret the amount of money 
transferred by the person in Group A as a measure of the degree of trust, and the amount 
of money returned by the person in Group B as a measure of trustworthiness. In Sweden 
51 per cent of the money was transferred, and 35 per cent returned; in Tanzania 53 per 
cent of the money was sent and 37 per cent returned. These differences are not 
statistically significant. When participants were asked the generalized trust question 
from the World Values Survey, 74 per cent said others could be trusted in Sweden and 
41 per cent said others could be trusted in Tanzania. The figure for Tanzania is vastly 
different to that reported in the World Values Survey, although it is possible this is 
because university students are more trusting than the population in general. Holm and 
Danielson’s results suggest that, when evaluated on the basis of experiments, the level 
of trust is just as high in Tanzania as in Sweden, whereas in the World Values survey 
the measure of TRUST differs by a factor of eight. This calls into question the 
generalization from the World Values survey that TRUST is typically higher in 
developed countries than in developing countries. 
 
Another potential problem with the trust question from the World Values Survey is that 
it does not really pin down who ‘most people’ are. Does this mean people you come 
into contact with regularly (thick trust), people like yourself (particularized trust) or 
anyone in your own village or country (thin, or generalized, trust)? As argued by   16
Guinnane (2005), neither does the question make it clear how much trust you are being 
expected to place in others. If you say you do trust others, does this mean you would 
trust them with a small sum of money or a large sum of money, or perhaps even your 
life?  
 
Knack and Keefer argue that the validity of TRUST is confirmed, to some extent, by an 
experiment conducted by the Readers’ Digest, who dropped a number of wallets in 
various countries around the world to see how many would be returned. The proportion 
of wallets returned was higher in countries with higher measures of TRUST, with a 
correlation of 0.67. With regard to the whether the question makes it clear how wide the 
radius of trust is, Uslaner (2002) presents evidence from a US survey that when 
respondents are asked to elaborate on their answers to the TRUST question, the majority 
of respondents include strangers in their definition of ‘most people’, suggesting the 
question is measuring generalized trust. 
 
Knack and Keefer suggest that CIVIC is a measure of the strength of norms of civic co-
operation within a society. However, this variable may be better interpreted as a 
measure of civic virtue. This is because a country is assigned a low value of CIVIC if, 
for example, everyone thinks it is alright to cheat on their taxes. However, if everyone 
were to cheat on their taxes, this could represent a civic norm. The CIVIC variable is 
perhaps best interpreted as a measure of trustworthiness. At a more practical level, 
another problem with CIVIC is that it does not exhibit much variation across countries. 
The maximum score is 42.43 and the minimum score 34.55, with a standard deviation 
of 2.3. There is much more variation across countries for both TRUST (range of 6.7 to 
61.2) and GROUPS (range of 0.38 to 1.70). One potential weakness of the GROUPS 
variable is that it only takes into account the number of associations an individual 
belongs to, rather than taking into account how committed members are to the group. 
 
It has been argued above that the social capital measures typically used in cross-country 
studies may well be measured with error. However, the same is probably true, to at least 
the same extent, with regard to the empirical proxies used in the formal institutions 
literature. Hence, if the social capital proxies are to be discounted on these grounds, so 
too should the proxies commonly used for formal institutions in the deep determinants 
literature. The two datasets most commonly used to proxy for formal institutions are the 
ICRG (International Country Risk Guide), also known as the Political Risk Services, 
measure of protection against expropriation risk (used by Hall and Jones 1999; 
Acemoglu et al. 2001, 2002), and the Kaufmann et al. (2002) dataset (used by Rodrik 
et al. 2002). These datasets are based on assessments by experts of, for example, the risk 
of expropriation in different countries, and are therefore subjective measures. Hence, 
there is no reason to believe these data are more reliable than, for example, survey-
based measures of trust.  
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Glaeser et al. (2004) have also pointed out that the ICRG and Kaufmann et al. measures 
do not measure formal constraints on the executive, which is how North (1990) defined 
formal institutions. Instead these variables tend to measure outcomes, in the sense that 
countries ruled by dictators who happen to choose to protect property rights, are 
awarded a high score, despite that fact that such countries cannot be classed as having 
good institutions, in the sense of there being constraints on executive power. Glaeser 
et al. also point out that these commonly used measures of institutions exhibit a lot of 
variation over time, so don’t meet the criterion for being a deep determinant of changing 
only slowly over time. 
 
Hence, although the World Values survey measures of social capital may not be ideal, 
they may be no worse than the proxies commonly used for formal institutions. This does 
not change the fact, however, that the search should continue for superior measures of 
social capital across countries. Possible alternatives will be discussed in Section 4.5. 
4.3  How much does social capital vary over time? 
This study has argued that social capital can be thought of as part of the institutions 
continuum, which suggests that social capital could be empirically modelled as a deep 
determinant of economic development, in the same way that formal institutions have 
been. For social capital to be considered a deep determinant also requires that it will 
change only slowly over time. Although social capital can be eroded quickly, it is often 
argued that social capital takes a long time to build (see, for example, Putnam et al. 
1993; Putnam 2000). North (1990: 6) argues that informal constraints embodied in 
customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are more impervious to deliberate policies and 
will change more slowly over time than will formal institutions. 
 
Whether or not social capital does change slowly over time will be evaluated by 
examining data on TRUST, from the World Values Survey, given that this is the most 
common proxy for social capital used in the cross-country literature. Although potential 
problems with the World Values Survey data have been acknowledged above, it is 
currently the only dataset available on social capital for a broad cross-section of 
countries. Whether TRUST is relatively stable over time can be assessed by comparing 
the TRUST data from the four different waves of the World Values Survey, for 
countries that have data for more than one wave. For the 60 countries that fall into this 
category, the average standard deviation within countries is 4.25, which does not seem 
particularly high. There are, however, some countries for which the measure of TRUST 
varies significantly over time, although this is not the norm. For example, Canada has a 
score of 52 in the second wave of the World Values Survey and a score of only 39 in the 
fourth wave. The USA has a score of 52 in the second wave and a score of only 36 in 
the fourth wave. This may represent a reduction in the level of trust in these countries, 
or alternatively, represent measurement error.   18
4.4  How highly correlated are formal and informal institutions? 
It is important to consider how highly correlated the standard measures of informal and 
formal institutions are. If the correlation is high, then little new information will be 
introduced by including measures of informal institutions in the deep determinants 
literature. The correlation coefficient between TRUST and Acemoglu et al.’s (2001, 
2002) measure of the risk of expropriation risk is 0.45, with Kaufmann et al.’s (2002) 
rule-of-law index it is 0.46, and with Glaeser et al.’s (2004) measure of constraints on 
the executive it is 0.35. None of these correlations is particularly high. Examination of 
the dataset underlying these calculations shows there are a number of countries with 
high values of TRUST, but low values for the various measures of formal institutions 
(China, Iran and Indonesia, for example) and vice versa (Singapore and Portugal, for 
example). Adding proxies for social capital (informal institutions) to the deep 
determinants literature would, therefore, add new information. Note however, that 
earlier sections of the paper have acknowledged potential problems with the World 
Values Survey data. Hence, the World Values survey data may not be the best to use for 
this purpose, although they are currently the only such data available for a broad cross-
section of countries. The next section of the study will discuss alternative measures of 
social capital that could be developed in the future. 
4.5  Suggestions for alternative social capital proxies 
The World Bank has recently designed a social capital questionnaire, the Integrated 
Questionnaire for the Measurement of Social Capital (SC-IQ), which they propose 
incorporating into household surveys of poverty. Details of the questionnaire, which has 
already been piloted in Albania and Nigeria, are given in Grootaert et al. (2004). The 
questionnaire includes questions on six dimensions of social capital: (1) groups and 
networks, (2) trust and solidarity, (3) collective action and co-operation, (4) information 
and communication, (5) social cohesion and inclusion and (6) empowerment and 
political action. The survey is incredibly detailed, including 95 questions under the six 
headings. Thirty-three of the questions relate to groups and networks. Alternatively, a 
core questionnaire has been designed, which includes what the World Bank considers to 
be the 27 key questions from the longer survey. 
 
The use of this questionnaire will hopefully lead to a rich dataset that can be used by 
social capital researchers. The questionnaire has been specifically designed with micro 
studies in mind, and there is no suggestion that the World Bank envisages aggregating 
these data into country measures. However, as long as the households surveyed are 
representative of the whole population of a specific country, and if the survey methods 
and questions remain consistent across countries, and if the data are collected for a large 
number of developing countries, the data should lend themselves to being aggregated 
into nation-wide measures of social capital, in the same way that researchers have used 
the World Values Survey data. The key advantage of the World Bank dataset, from the 
perspective of development economists, would be that it will focus on developing   19
countries, whereas the World Values Survey includes a large number of developed 
countries and East European transition economies. 
 
Rather than relying on survey-based data, another possibility in terms of trust data is to 
use data collected in experiments, such as the experiment conducted by Holm and 
Danielson (2005) in Tanzania and Sweden, which are described earlier in the study. 
Such experiments do not necessarily have to involve the use of computers or other 
equipment, so it is feasible that they could be carried out in developing countries, even 
in remote areas. Researchers planning to collect survey data on social capital in different 
villages could potentially also use similar experiments to that of Holm and Danielson to 
generate a measure of village-wide trust. 
4.6  The problem of simultaneity 
The only papers that attempt to address the issue of simultaneity in the existing cross-
country social capital literature are Knack and Keefer (1997), Zak and Knack (2001), 
and Tabellini (2005). Simultaneity is a potential problem as it is possible that people can 
afford to be more trusting, or belong to more groups, in countries where the economy is 
growing more quickly. Controlling for such simultaneity bias requires finding 
instruments that are both correlated with social capital (good instruments), but which 
have no independent correlation with the dependent variable (valid instruments). Knack 
and Keefer instrument for TRUST with the percentage of a country’s population 
belonging to the largest ethnolinguistic group and the number of law students as a 
proportion of all tertiary students. Whether these variables are valid instruments is 
questionable, given that they may well have an independent effect on the dependent 
variable. Rather than using the Knack and Keefer instruments for TRUST, Zak and 
Knack use the shares of the population that are Catholic, Muslim or Eastern Orthodox 
as instruments, arguing that these hierarchical religions have negative effects on trust. 
Again, it could be argued that these variables may have an independent effect on 
growth, making them invalid instruments. In critiquing these instruments, Durlauf and 
Fafchamps (2004: 53) argue ‘[w]e are not aware of any social capital study using 
aggregate data that addresses causality versus correlation for social capital and growth 
in a persuasive way. While this is a broad brush with which to tar this empirical 
literature, we believe it is valid.’  
 
A useful starting point for thinking about addressing the problem of simultaneity, with 
regard to social capital (informal institutions), is to consider how this issue has been 
tackled to date with regards to formal institutions in the deep determinants literature. 
Hall and Jones (1999) argue that measures of the degree of Western European influence 
and distance from the equator can be used to instrument for institutions. The argument 
is that institutions which protect property rights and encourage production, rather than 
diversion, were first developed in Western Europe. Hence countries more exposed to 
Western European influence are more likely to have adopted these institutions. The   20
logic behind using distance from the equator as an instrument is that Europeans did not 
settle near the equator.  
 
Another instrument, which has drawn much comment in the literature, has been 
proposed by Acemoglu et al. (2001), who argue that settler mortality during the colonial 
period can be used as an instrument for current institutions. Their argument is that the 
colonial powers set up one of two types of institutions in their colonies. In countries 
where mortality rates were low enough for Europeans to settle, institutions were 
established that protected the property rights of the population in general. However, in 
regions where mortality rates were too high for permanent settlement to be viable, the 
European powers were more concerned with extracting raw materials as quickly as 
possible, and, therefore, set up institutions geared to that end. As institutions tend to 
persist over time, countries where mortality rates for settlers were low have inherited 
institutions that protect property rights. They argue further that rates of settler mortality 
in the past are uncorrelated with health levels today, precluding an independent effect of 
settler mortality on current income per capita. Hence, they argue, settler mortality is a 
valid instrument. The validity of settler mortality as an instrument has been questioned 
on various grounds. Glaeser et al. argue that it is just as likely that settlers took their 
human capital with them, as it is that they took their institutions with them, when they 
emigrated. If human capital has persisted over time, and if human capital affects income 
per capita, instruments relying on settlement patterns are no longer valid instruments. 
Glaeser et al. also report that the correlation between settler mortality and current health 
levels is high, which also calls into question the validity of the settler mortality 
instrument. 
 
Drawing on this literature, Tabellini (2005) uses the settler mortality variable as an 
instrument for TRUST in cross-country regressions explaining income per capita, and 
finds that TRUST is positively correlated with income per capita. However, given that 
the setter mortality instrument is only available for a limited number of countries, the 
sample size is limited to 20 countries. In his regressions examining the effect of TRUST 
and other cultural variables6 on income per capita across European regions, he uses 
historical data on both formal institutions (data from 1600-1850) and literacy levels 
(data from 1880) as instruments for culture. Tabellini argues that formal institutions will 
shape culture, as, for example, an authoritarian regime will breed mistrust.  However, 
past institutions will have no independent effect on income per capita across regions, 
once country dummies have been included, which will pick up the effect of current 
national institutions on income per capita.  
 
 
                                                 
6 The other cultural variables are measures of the extent to which individuals feel they have the freedom 
to shape their own destiny, the extent of tolerance and respect for others, and whether people view 
children obeying their parents as being an important quality.   21
Tabellini has shown that the settler mortality instrument used in the formal institutions 
literature can also be used as an instrument for variables like TRUST. As new and better 
instruments are found for formal institutions, it is possible they could also be used as 
instruments for informal institutions, given that formal institutions and informal 
institutions are simply different ends of the same continuum. It should be noted, 
however, that if formal institutions and social capital are to both be included as 
explanatory variables, two instruments need to be found for the purposes of 
identification, which may explain why Tabellini did not include formal institutions as a 
control variable in his cross-country equations. Another potential problem with this 
suggestion is that formal and informal institutions may evolve in quite different ways. If 
Acemoglu’s argument is to be believed, institutions have typically been imposed 
externally. It is likely that informal institutions, on the other hand, evolve endogenously 
from within a country. If this is true, then a variable that is a good instrument for formal 
institutions may not always be a good instrument for informal institutions. Another 
possibility is that there may be some cultural variables that could be used as instruments 
for social capital, such as religious affiliation, but this requires that such variables have 
no independent effect on income per capita.  
5  How will the social capital and institutional literatures be enriched by 
modelling social capital as a deep determinant of development? 
This study has argued that social capital is a similar concept to what North (1990) 
defined as informal institutions. Furthermore, if social capital is considered to be part of 
the institutional continuum, it could be modelled empirically as a deep determinant of 
economic development in the same way formal institutions has been. This section of the 
study will summarize how the deep determinants of development and social capital 
literatures would be enriched if this were to happen. 
 
The ‘capital’ in ‘social capital’ leads many to assume that it is a form of capital, to be 
added to the list of reproducible capitals along with physical and human capital. 
However, it was argued in Section 3 of the study that social capital is best thought of as 
a deep determinant of economic development, which largely affects income via its 
affect on the accumulation of other factors of production or the level of total factor 
productivity (the proximate determinants), rather than as a factor of production in its 
own right. If social capital is not a form of capital, then the term ‘informal institutions’ 
may be a more useful descriptor. Whether social capital (informal institutions) is viewed 
as a proximate or deep determinant is not merely a semantic point. The framework used 
to analyse how social capital affects income has implications for how its effects should 
be analysed empirically.  
 
If social capital is thought of as a factor of production, then the effects of social capital 
on income are best modelled, as a proximate determinant of development, in a 
production function framework, controlling for the effects of other factors of production   22
such as physical and human capital. This is how the effects of social capital have 
typically been analysed in the existing cross-country studies on social capital. For 
example, Whitely (2000) controls for the accumulation of physical and human capital 
and Knack and Keefer (1997) and Zak and Knack (2001) control for investment in 
physical capital. However, if social capital (informal institutions) is thought to be a deep 
determinant, controlling for physical and human capital is inappropriate. This is because 
physical and human capital are both proximate determinants of income that are, in part, 
explained by the level of social capital. Including them as control variables in the 
regression equation means the indirect effect of social capital on income per capita, via 
these proximate determinants, will not be picked up. If social capital really is a deep 
determinant of development, then the control variables should be the other potential 
deep determinants of development, such as formal institutions and geographic variables, 
not the proximate determinants such as human and physical capital accumulation. 
 
As was argued in Section 4.5, following the lead of the deep determinants literature may 
assist in the choice of instruments for social capital. Tabellini (2005) has shown that the 
settler mortality variable that has been used as an instrument for formal institutions can 
be used as an instrument for TRUST. Other variables that have been used as instruments 
for formal institutions could conceivably be used as instruments for social capital 
(informal) institutions, given that formal and informal institutions represent different 
ends of the same continuum. 
 
The existing deep determinants literature will also be enriched by considering the role 
of social capital (informal institutions). There are a large number of studies analysing 
the effect of institutions on income per capita, within a deep determinants framework. 
However, in these studies the focus is almost entirely on formal institutions, especially 
those related to property rights. Bardhan (2005: 500) criticises this literature for having 
too narrow a view of institutions arguing ‘[t]his preoccupation of the literature with the 
institution of security of property rights, often to the exclusion of other important 
institutions, severely limits our understanding of the development process.’ However, 
Bardhan extends this literature by including additional proxies for formal, rather than 
informal, institutions. North (1990) argued that informal institutions, such as co-
operative norms, are more important than formal institutions, meaning that the current 
deep determinants literature may well suffer from omitted variables bias. Remaining 
true to North’s definition of institutions requires including proxies for informal 
institutions. It is also important to control for possible interactions between formal and 
informal institutions. Failure to consider the role of informal institutions would not 
matter so much if formal and informal institutions were highly correlated, but it has 
been argued earlier that this is not the case.   23
6 Conclusion 
This study has argued that social capital is a similar notion to what North (1990) defined 
as informal institutions. North defined formal institutions as rules devised by human 
beings, whereas informal institutions are codes of conduct and conventions of 
behaviour. Formal institutions can be considered analogous to the written rules of a 
sport, with informal institutions being analogous to unwritten codes of conduct 
generally adhered to by the players. Institutions can sometimes be difficult to categorise 
into formal and informal, so it can be useful to think of institutions forming a 
continuum, with written constitutions at one end, and taboos, customs and traditions at 
the other. Towards the middle of the continuum will come community-based 
institutions, such as those that exist in many parts of the world to manage common 
property resources.  
 
There are many different definitions of social capital used in the literature, but most of 
these definitions include at least one of the notions of trust, a shared set of co-operative 
norms, and networks and/or associational memberships. Hence, in terms of its 
definition, social capital seems similar to the notion of informal institutions. Social 
capital researchers often argue that social capital will improve economic performance 
by reducing transactions costs and encouraging co-operation, a point also made by 
North with regard to informal institutions. Although North (1990) is frequently cited by 
researchers in both the social capital literature and the institutions as a deep determinant 
literature, neither group of researchers tends to acknowledge the work of the other. 
 
This study has argued that when empirically estimating the effect of social capital on 
economic development across countries, social capital can be added to the list of deep 
determinants of economic development, along with formal institutions and geography. 
Deep determinants are variables that affect income per capita (or other proxies of 
economic development), via their effect on the proximate determinants, such as factor 
accumulation or total factor productivity. They are also variables that change very 
slowly, if at all, over time. Section 3 of the study reviewed a selection of the arguments 
as to why social capital is likely to affect economic performance. These arguments 
suggested that social capital is likely to affect either the level of total factor 
productivity, or the rate of factor accumulation, hence it seems sensible to think of 
social capital as a deep determinant, rather than a proximate determinant. In addition, 
data were presented in Section 4 suggesting that social capital does not vary much 
across time within a given country. Thinking of social capital as a deep determinant of 
economic development, therefore, seems reasonable. As discussed in Section 5, whether 
social capital is a deep, or proximate, determinant of development has implications for 
which control variables should be included in regressions analysing the effect of social 
capital on the level of income per capita. 
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Including measures of social capital (informal institutions) in deep determinants 
regressions will, of course, require that data of reasonable quality be available for a 
large number of countries. This study has, at times, made reference to possible measures 
from the World Values Survey, while acknowledging that these data are far from 
perfect. Over time, the ideal would be for experimental data to be collected that measure 
the degree of trust and co-operative norms in different countries. The literature on 
institutions as a deep determinant of economic development has focused exclusively on 
the effect of formal institutions on income per capita, despite North’s suggestion that 
informal institutions are more important. This institutions as a deep determinant 
literature will be enriched by considering both ends of the institutions continuum.  
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Appendix 
Table A1: Commonly cited definitions of social capital 
Author(s) Definition 
Coleman (1988: S95)  ‘…obligations and expectations, information channels, and social 
norms.’ 
Coleman (1990: 304)  ‘…social organization constitutes social capital, facilitating the 
achievement of goals that could not be achieved in its absence 
or could be achieved only at a higher cost.’ 
Putnam et al. (1993: 167)  ‘features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and 
networks that can improve the efficiency of society.’ 
Fukuyama (1997: 378-9)  ‘…the existence of a certain set of informal rules or norms 
shared among members of a group that permits co-operation 
among them. The sharing of values and norms does not in itself 
produce social capital, because the norms may be the wrong 
ones… The norms that produce social capital… must 
substantively include virtues like truth telling, the meeting of 
obligations and reciprocity.’ 
Knack and Keefer (1997: 1251)  ‘Trust, co-operative norms, and associations within groups.’ 
Narayan and Pritchett (1999: 872)  ‘…the quantity and quality of associational life and the related 
social norms.’ 
Putnam (2000: 19)  ‘…connections among individuals—social networks and norms 
of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them.’ 
Ostrom (2000: 176)  ‘…the shared knowledge, understandings, norms, rules and 
expectations about patterns of interactions that groups of 
individuals bring to a recurrent activity.’ 
Woolcock (2001: 13)  ‘…the norms and networks that facilitate collective action…it is 
important that any definition of social capital focus on its sources 
rather than consequences… This approach eliminates an entity 
such as ‘trust’ from the definition of social capital.’  
Lin (2001: 24-5)  ‘…resources embedded in social networks and accessed and 
used by actors for actions. Thus the concept has two important 
components: (1) it represents resources embedded in social 
relations rather than individuals, and (2) access and use of such 
resources reside with the actors.’ 
Bowles and Gintis (2002: 2)  ‘…trust, concern for one’s associates, a willingness to live by the 
norms of one’s community and to punish those who do not.’ 
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Knack (2002: 42)  ‘I use the term government social capital to refer to institutions 
that influence people’s ability to co-operate for mutual benefit. 
The most commonly analysed of these institutions … include the 
enforceability of contracts, the rule of law, and the extent of civil 
liberties permitted by the state.’ 
‘Civil social capital encompasses common values, norms, 
informal networks, and associational memberships that affect 
the ability of individuals to work together to achieve common 
goals.’ 
Sobel (2002: 139)  ‘Social capital describes circumstances in which individuals can 
use membership in groups and networks to secure benefits.’ 
Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004: 5)   ‘(1) social capital generates positive externalities for members 
of a group; (2) these exernalities are achieved through shared 
trust, norms and values and their consequent effects on 
expectations and behaviour; (3) shared trust, norms and values 
arise from informal forms of organizations based on social 
networks and associations.’ 
World Bank (2005)  ‘[T]he norms and networks that enable collective action.’ 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
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